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Phishing campaigns continue to deceive users into revealing their credentials,
despite advancing spam filters, browser and toolbar warnings, and educational
efforts. Recently, researchers have begun investigating how fake credentials — or
honeytokens — can be used to detect phishing sites and protect users. Bogus-
Biter, one such work, creates sets of honeytokens based on users’ real credentials
and sends them alongside real user submissions to phishing sites. In this paper,
we present Phish Feeder, an anti-phishing tool which extends the BogusBiter
honeytoken generation algorithm in order to create more realistic and authentic-
looking credentials. Phish Feeder also employs a “honeytoken repository” which
stores generated credentials and provides a lookup service for legitimate sites
that encounter invalid credentials. The Phish Feeder client is implemented as a
Firefox extension and the repository is implemented as a Java web application.
We compare the effectiveness of the Phish Feeder generation algorithm to that
of the previous work and find that it is up to four times as effective at hiding
real users’ credentials within a set. Furthermore, we find that Phish Feeder in-
troduces only negligible overhead during normal browsing, and a low overhead
during credential creation and submission.
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Phishing is an online form of identity theft in which “phishers” pose as legiti-
mate entities in order to trick users into revealing sensitive personal information.
The term comes from the fact that phishers “fish” for credentials from legitimate
users. The term phishing was first used circa 1996 to describe scams in which in-
dividuals posing as AOL staff tricked users into revealing their billing information
[28]. Phishing attacks have continued throughout the years, becoming increas-
ingly prevalent and sophisticated. The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG)
reported a 20% increase in the number of phishing attacks in the second half
of 2008 [20]. Originally, phishing sites were run by individual phishers working
independently; today, phishing campaigns are carried out en masse under the
supervision of organized crime [15].
For each phishing campaign, phishers choose an established legitimate site
to mimic. Phishing sites are then designed which imitate the look and feel of
the legitimate site and emails linking to these sites are sent to potential victims.
These emails typically include some “call to action”. For example, a phishing
email claiming to be from a financial institution may ask that users follow a
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link and confirm their account details to verify their identity or prevent account
deletion. Rather than linking to the financial institution itself, the email will link
to a phishing site disguised as the financial institution.
Phishers most frequently choose to pose as financial institutions and online
payment services, although any popular site may chosen, as usernames and pass-
words are often re-used across multiple sites. Phishers usually send emails to a
large number of recipients and impersonate a popular site to increase the odds
that a recipient will have an account at that site and that the email will appear
genuine. The same legitimate sites are chosen frequently; in January of 2008,
80% of the phishing campaigns reported to APWG represented only 15 of the
131 reported “hijacked brands” [19]. In contrast, “spearphishing” is a technique
in which emails are sent to smaller, more targeted groups. This technique allows
phishers to run more tailored campaigns, and potentially fool a larger percentage
of their victims.
Researchers have responded to the threat of phishing by creating a variety of
anti-phishing solutions, designed to detect phishing sites and warn users of poten-
tial danger. However, studies have shown that users may frequently ignore these
warnings, especially if a detection scheme is prone to false positives [32]. Much
anti-phishing research concentrates on preventing users from disclosing their cre-
dentials to phishers, either by discouraging them from submitting sensitive data
on untrusted sites or by warning them when a site appears malicious. While this
is optimal, some users may still ignore warnings or unknowingly submit their cre-
dentials to phishing sites. Protecting users in this case is a task not fully explored
in the current literature.
Recent research has examined how fake credentials can be used to protect
users, even when users are tricked into revealing their credentials. In this paper,
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we introduce Phish Feeder, an anti-phishing tool which expands on this research.
Phish Feeder uses intelligently-generated fake credentials to clutter and devalue
phishing databases and protect end users. Every submission on a phishing site
triggers the generation of fake credentials, which are sent alongside the real cre-
dentials to the phishing site. The goal is to prevent phishers from determinis-
tically knowing which credentials are valuable, forcing them to either guess or
test each credential individually. Additionally, a Phish Feeder central repository
provides a lookup service which can be used by legitimate sites; this service can
determine if invalid credentials originated from a Phish Feeder client, which may
be used to identify phishers who use these credentials.
The rest of this document is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
previous work done in this area. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the high- and low-
level details of the system and its design. Section 5 covers the evaluation and
subsequent analysis of the system. Section 6 summarizes our conclusions and




As phishing attacks grow more sophisticated, so do the techniques used to
detect and defeat them. The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) currently
receives reports of over 20,000 new phishing sites every month [1]. Researchers
have responded by creating and improving a wide array of techniques to prevent
phishers from succeeding, including phishing site detection, new paradigms for
authentication, and fake credential generation.
2.1 Phishing Site Detection
A phishing site’s success depends on how well it can mimic its target; pages
that bear no resemblance to the target site or contain obvious differences are
much less likely to attract users’ credentials. Thus, phishers focus on making
their site as close to an exact duplicate of their target as possible, often copying
the pages directly and changing only a few fields. Several studies have shown that
users have a hard time distinguishing real sites from their phishy counterparts [14]
[21]. Due to this, a significant amount of research has been devoted to detection
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of phishing sites and corresponding user notification schemes.
The techniques proposed range from leveraging lists of known safe and unsafe
sites to static and dynamic analysis of various page properties. Many of these
techniques have been implemented as browser extensions and several have already
been incorporated directly into the major web browsers.
2.1.1 Blacklists and Whitelists
In the context of phishing site detection, a blacklist is a list of known phishing
sites. Many phishing detection tools — including those built into major web
browsers — use blacklists to some extent. A recent study found that eight of
ten popular anti-phishing toolbars used blacklists as all or part of their detection
scheme [11]. However, blacklists are not an all-inclusive solution to phishing, as
sites are only added to blacklists after they have been discovered and reported.
Blacklists may be updated by a variety of sources, from spam filters to individual
user submissions; depending on the trustworthiness of these sources, these new
entries may need additional verification before they are added to the blacklist
[31]. Users who visit phishing sites before they have been added to the blacklist
will receive no warning; for this reason, blacklists are often frequently updated -
the Firefox blacklist is updated “every 30 minutes or so” [25].
In contrast to blacklists, whitelists are lists of known safe or trusted sites.
Whitelists are generally pre-populated with popular, trusted sites and are up-
dated by end users as needed. Whitelists are infrequently used as a complete
anti-phishing solution; instead, whitelists are usually checked before running some
other detection algorithm to reduce false positives.
In 2005, Kirda and Krugel proposed AntiPhish, a browser extension which
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protects users from submitting their credentials to unauthorized sites by main-
taining a whitelist of known sites [22]. As users browse and enter their credentials,
they can choose to store these credentials and the associated site’s domain in An-
tiPhish’s whitelist. Each time a user submits their data to a website, AntiPhish
checks the whitelist; if the user enters known credentials into an unknown or un-
trusted site, AntiPhish displays a warning and allows them to cancel the request.
Cao et al. introduced the Automated Individual White-List (AIWL), an anti-
phishing tool based on an individual user’s whitelist of known trusted sites [6].
AIWL is trained to recognize successful and unsuccessful login attempts through
the use of a Naive Bayesian classifier. After repeated successful login attempts,
AIWL prompts the user to add a site to the whitelist. The whitelist is composed
of each trusted site’s Login User Interface (LUI) — the site’s URL, a hash of its
security certificate, a hash of the credential for that site, valid IPs for the URL,
and the HTML DOM path to the username and password input elements. Users
are warned when they submit their credentials to a site which is not present in the
whitelist. This system assumes that users will only repeatedly submit credentials
to legitimate sites, and that all other sites are potentially malicious.
Several other phishing detection tools maintain whitelists to allow users to
store exceptions and prevent repeated false positives in detection [17] [29]. Lim-
iting repeated false positives via whitelists may improve the user experience, but
it introduces potential risks if a phishing site is accidentally or maliciously added
to the whitelist or if a previously benevolent site becomes malicious.
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2.1.2 Heuristic-Based Detection
Blacklists and whitelists can only be used to recall previously identified sites.
In order to automatically detect phishing sites, a variety of heuristics have been
developed. The tools in this section use one or several heuristics to identify
phishing sites based on common patterns and characteristics. All of these tools
share common ground in that the detection is not foolproof: as the heuristics are
not absolute, they are prone to both false positives and false negatives.
In 2004, researchers from Stanford proposed an Internet Explorer toolbar they
dubbed SpoofGuard [10] to detect malicious sites. SpoofGuard uses a config-
urable, weighted algorithm to determine the probability that a page is malicious
based on a variety of heuristics. SpoofGuard analyzes URLs for patterns used
by phishing sites, compares images on the site to those from popular domains,
and hashes and compares post data to stored sensitive data. SpoofGuard also
allows the user to configure the algorithmic weights in order to control the level
of false positives. Subsequent studies have found SpoofGuard to have a 90% true
positive rate, but a 35–48% false positive rate [24] [37].
Chen and Guo [9] improved on the URL analysis work done in SpoofGuard.
After studying 203 phishing emails collected from the APWG [1], they identified
five categories of website link obfuscation employed by phishing sites and mea-
sured their frequency. Links are classified as belonging to a phishing site if one
of the following is true:
• The anchor link and text use DNS names, but the DNS names do not match
each other
• The anchor link uses a dotted decimal IP address instead of a DNS name
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• The anchor link is encoded or uses a username/password prefix
• The anchor link uses a DNS name but the anchor text does not
• The anchor uses a redirect vulnerability from a legitimate site
The authors obtained a 96% success rate identifying phishing links from the 203
phishing emails studied; however, no analysis was performed of the tool’s false
positive rate.
Around the same time, Garera et al. [17] also developed techniques for iden-
tifying phishing sites based on properties of the site’s URL, including if the
hostname is an IP address or if the hostname or path contains the domain be-
ing targeted. Additionally, Garera et al. proposed several new heuristics: the
site’s Google PageRank, presence in a pre-defined whitelist, and certain key-
words within the URL. The authors acquired a base set of 2,508 URLs — about
half of which were known phishing sites. They trained their tool on the first 66%
of the sites (chosen at random), then ran their tool against the remaining URLs.
They found their tool had a 88% true positive rate, and a 0.7% false positive
rate.
Likarish et al. from the University of Iowa proposed B-APT, a means of
identifying phishing sites by training and utilizing a Bayesian filter [24]; Bayesian
filters are already widely used to identify spam emails, with extremely positive
results. If a website is not in B-APT’s whitelist, it is tokenized and analyzed by
the Bayesian filter, which returns a probability that the site is a phishing site.
Likarish et al. trained B-APT with legitimate sites from the Alexa Top 500 [5] and
phishing sites from Broadband Report’s Phishtrack [13]. When tested against 60
phishing and 60 legitimate sites, B-APT obtained a 100% true positive and 3%
false positive rate of detection.
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Along a similar vein, Zhang et al. developed CANTINA [37], a tool for detect-
ing phishing sites based on a generated lexical signature of a page. The authors
used a TF-IDF (term frequency — inverse document frequency) algorithm, which
calculates how “important” a word is in a document by measuring its frequency
in the document and its frequency across all documents in a set. The five terms
on the page with the highest TF-IDF score are fed to Google; if the current page
does not appear within the top 30 results, then it is determined to be a phishing
site. The authors also used a variety of heuristics similar to those already pre-
sented to lower their false positive rate. With these heuristics, the tool achieved
an 89% true positive and a 1–3% false positive rate.
In 2008, Ronda et al. created iTrustPage [29], in an attempt to reduce the
false positives and false negatives associated with the heuristics of the above-
mentioned papers. iTrustPage is not a fully automated tool and partially relies
on user input to make the “correct” decision about the validity of a site. Like
CANTINA, iTrustPage performs a Google search based on key terms for the
page; unlike CANTINA, the search terms are supplied by the user. The first
time users encounter a form not present in iTrustPage’s pre-defined whitelist,
they are prompted for a set of search terms, which are used to make a Google
search. If the current site is not present in the results, the top sites from the re-
sults are displayed as an overlay on top of the current page, and the user is given
the option to navigate to any of these sites. Ronda et al. deployed iTrustPage
and collected statistics on how many pages were visited and how frequently the
tool required user intervention. They found that iTrustPage disrupts the user on
less than 2% of pages visited after a week of use; of that 2%, users chose to bypass
iTrustPage’s validation 88% of the time. Due to privacy concerns, the authors
did not gather browsing history and cannot determine if iTrustPage prevented
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any users from becoming victims of phishing attacks.
2.2 Authentication Mechanisms
Although many tools have been developed to detect phishing sites and alert
users, phishing continues to be a serious problem. One study suggests that this
is because current user notification techniques are inadequate; Wu et al. found
that up to 60% of users were fooled by a phishing site, even when warned by
an anti-phishing toolbar. To combat this, researchers have studied different au-
thentication mechanisms to help users enter their credentials only at valid sites.
These new mechanisms include authentication protocols, visual feedback tech-
niques, password hashing, and three-factor authentication schemes.
2.2.1 Browser Modifications
The following techniques combine some new authentication mechanism with
a new visual element to help users identify when they are at a trusted site. Most
of these proposals suffer from a common shortcoming — each of these tools must
be set up on a per-computer or per-browser basis, resulting in a negative user
experience for those who interact frequently with multiple workstations.
Dhamija and Tygar [12] suggested pairing a new authentication strategy with
a visual identification system they labeled Dynamic Security Skins. The browser
is modified to include a separate “trusted password window”, which is solely used
for password entry and to display security information. The trusted password
window uses a user-chosen image as a background image, in order to greatly
reduce the possibility of the window being spoofed by a phisher. Users input
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their username and password into the trusted password window to login to a web
site. A hash is exchanged between the user and the web server, which is then used
to create an image via a visual hash algorithm. The hash is exchanged via an
adaptation of the Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP). This protocol requires
that users prove they know their password and the server knows the user’s verifier
(a hash of the password and a salt), without either party directly exchanging this
information; see [34] for more information about the SRP protocol. Phishing sites,
which presumably do not have the user’s verifier, cannot properly authenticate via
the SRP protocol and no hash image will be generated. If the protocol succeeds,
the trusted password window and web page both display the hash image and
users can compare the images to ensure they are interacting with a trusted site.
Wu et al. also designed a browser sidebar specifically for handling user logins,
named WebWallet [33]. WebWallet forces the user to login through WebWallet
by detecting and disabling all password fields on a page. When users submit
credentials to an untrusted site for the first time, they are asked to choose which
site they intended to submit to from a list. If the user choice’s does not correspond
with the current site, a link is provided to the intended site. Users may also view
security details about the current site, including presence of a verified certificate,
the length of time the domain has been registered, and the site’s country of origin.
Users may also store their credentials (as a domain, user, and password tuple)
for future logins. Forms for which there are saved credentials are automatically
populated on recurring visits when the user hits the predefined “security key”.
The authors argue that this saved credential interface provides protections and
simultaneously simplifies repeat logins to trusted sites.
PwdHash, presented by Ross et al., uses a password hashing algorithm in
order to secure user’s passwords [30]. Any time a user needs to enter their pass-
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word, they first enter the PwdHash-defined password prefix (“@@”). As they
type their password, each character is saved and replaced with a fixed sequence
to thwart JavaScript-based password-stealing attacks. On form submission, the
password sequence is replaced with a hash of the user’s password, salted with the
current domain. PwdHash requires the browser extension to be installed on each
machine the user needs to login at; they mitigate this weakness by providing a
site which mimics PwdHash’s capabilities — users can enter a site domain and
their password and receive the hashed password for that domain. This calcula-
tion is done entirely via client-side JavaScript to avoid transmitting the user’s
password over the network.
In 2006, Yee and Sitaker [35] also presented a password hashing-based so-
lution to phishing. With PassPet, the user registers a unique username at the
PassPet server via a browser extension. The user is assigned a random animal
icon and “pet name”, to be displayed in the PassPet toolbar; like the personal
image background in the Dynamic Security Skins paper, these personalizations
reduce the possibility of spoofing the browser interface. During normal use, users
assign a unique label to each site they wish to login to; users are notified when
they attempt to use the same label for multiple sites, which may indicate phish-
ing attacks. PassPet uses a user-supplied “master secret”, the user’s PassPet
username, and the site label as inputs to a password hashing algorithm, which
is used to generate a unique password for each site the user authenticates with.
As long as labels are unique across sites, the passwords supplied to each site will
be different. Users do not know their individual passwords, so they cannot be
tricked into providing them to a phishing site. This means that like PwdHash
above, users cannot log into their accounts without installing the tool on each
workstation they frequent.
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2.2.2 New Authentication Paradigms
The above authentication techniques all require some modification to the ex-
isting browser interface. While changing existing interfaces is possible, it requires
developer effort, and must be done separately for each browser. Alternative au-
thentication techniques have been proposed which allow users to login to sites
without browser modifications; some merely require server-side changes, while
others also require a third, trusted device to ensure secure authentication.
Rather than create new browser interfaces, Adida [4] suggests a two-factor
web authentication scheme based on browser bookmarks called BeamAuth. Using
BeamAuth, users are given a custom bookmark, which they use to login to a site;
during first login, this bookmark is provided to the user through a second-channel
authentication mechanism, such as an SMS or email verification. The bookmark’s
URL fragment contains a user-specific secret token. When users navigate to the
site via the bookmark, JavaScript on the page reads in the secret token, stores
it as a local variable, populates the username in the login form, and removes
the fragment from the address bar. When users submit the form with their
password, the JavaScript intercepts the call and sends a secure hash of the user’s
token and password to the server. This technique means that the website always
requires both the token and password to log in and the server only stores a hash
of the token and password. Additionally, users who are tricked into revealing
their passwords at a phishing site have released only one of the two forms of
authentication necessary for the site.
Parno et al. suggest Phoolproof: an authentication mechanism which uses
an external trusted device, such as a cellphone, to protect users from phishing
attacks [26]. The device acts as a third-party oracle during both initial account
13
setup and subsequent logins, providing information to the user’s browser and ver-
ifying stored server certificates. During an account setup, the device generates a
public/private key pair and stores this pair with the web server’s security certifi-
cate. The public key is then communicated via the user’s browser and associated
with the user’s account on the server. To later establish a secure connection
with the web server, the server’s stored certificate is first verified by the device,
then the shared public key is used to establish a SSL/TLS connection. Once a
secure connection is established with the assistance of the device, the user is free
to browse the site normally. The advantage of this mechanism is that a phisher
must compromise both the user’s password and device in order to gain access to
the account.
2.3 Fake Credentials
All of the above areas of research take a defensive stand to identify phish-
ing sites or protect a user’s credentials. Recently, research has been conducted
studying potential offensive measures against phishing sites, particularly through
the use of falsified data.
In 2006, Madhusudhanan et al. proposed an offensive detection tool named
PHONEY designed to function between a mail server and mail client [8]. PHONEY
analyzes incoming messages based on a set of heuristics. If the message or any
sites it links to contain a form requesting sensitive information, the message is
tagged as malicious, and the tool proceeds with its detection algorithm. The fields
of the form are then populated with fake data from PHONEY’s database based
on each field name. The form is then submitted to the site, and the response
is analyzed by a rule-based decision engine to determine if the site represents
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a phishing attack. Based on their sample set of 20 phishing emails and some
legitimate emails, the authors claim PHONEY is able to detect all email-based
phishing attacks without false alarms.
Yue and Wang later proposed BogusBiter, a browser extension which feeds
a large number of fake credentials to a phishing site [36]. BogusBiter’s design
has two main goals — to fill the phishers’ databases with fake credentials and
allow legitimate sites to detect when stolen credentials are being used. When
users visit a phishing site and submit their credentials, BogusBiter intercepts
the request and creates a set of fake credentials based on the user’s credentials.
All of the credentials are sent to the phishing site simultaneously. The fake
credentials are created using numerical and alphabetical substitution; the goal
of the substitution strategy is to create fake credentials such that picking out
the real credentials from the set is extremely difficult. Additionally, the authors
propose a mechanism which can detect phishers who use these fake credentials.
The properties of the algorithm ensure that rerunning the algorithm with any of
the fake credentials as the input will result in a new set of generated credentials
which contain the real credentials. A legitimate site may use this to its advantage
by running this algorithm on invalid credentials it receives; if any legitimate
credentials are present in the generated set, then the invalid credentials were
likely generated by BogusBiter, and the user providing the credentials is likely a
phisher. The site can then take appropriate actions to block the phisher, warn
the user, and/or block the user’s account temporarily.
In this paper we introduce Phish Feeder, an anti-phishing tool which uses
carefully crafted fake credentials in order to protect users and devalue phishing
databases. Phish Feeder was largely inspired by the BogusBiter tool, and shares
some of the same strategies of request creation and credential generation. Like
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BogusBiter, our tool also feeds a large number of fake credentials to suspected
phishing sites; however, Phish Feeder builds on and extends BogusBiter in the
following key ways:
• In addition to handling usernames and passwords, Phish Feeder also sup-
ports other types of sensitive information, including credit card and social
security numbers.
• Phish Feeder extends the substitution algorithm presented in BogusBiter
to better obfuscate the legitimate credentials within the credential set.
• Rather than creating a reversible substitution algorithm, Phish Feeder em-
ploys a secondary “honeytoken repository” as an interface for determining




Phish Feeder is composed of two distinct parts: a client-side browser extension
to create and send fake data and a central server to act as a repository for this
data.
The browser extension protects users by accompanying any submissions to a
phishing site with a set of fake submissions. Rather than receiving one valuable
request, the phisher receives a set of requests, only one of which contains real
credentials. Phishers have the option of attempting to manually identify the real
credentials or accepting all of the credentials and polluting their database. The
former requires extra effort on the phisher’s part, while the latter may reduce the
value of the database.
Phish Feeder also provides a way of identifying those phishers who choose to
keep and later use the fake credentials. All of the generated credentials are stored
in a central honeytoken repository, which provides a lookup service. Legitimate
sites which receive invalid credentials may query the repository to determine if
these credentials were generated by Phish Feeder; if the credentials are present in
17
the repository, there is a high probability that the user providing these credentials
is a phisher.
3.1 Generating and Sending Honeytokens
The Phish Feeder browser extension is installed on each end-user’s computer.
The extension is responsible for detecting form submissions on a phishing site,
analyzing the forms, generating fake credentials, and sending the fake credentials
to the phishing site alongside the real request. The phishing site receives all of
the credentials and cannot easily determine which credentials are legitimate, even
with manual inspection. The extension also submits the generated credentials to
the honeytoken repository, where they are stored for future lookup requests.
3.1.1 Request Monitoring
Once installed, the Phish Feeder extension does not collect information or
generate honeytokens until it detects the user is visiting a phishing site. Phish
Feeder currently uses Firefox’s built-in phishing detection to determine when the
user visits a phishing site, although additional heuristics could be included in the
future. Once a phishing site is reached, Phish Feeder begins monitoring form
submissions. Phish Feeder ignores all form submissions on presumed legitimate
websites — no information about these forms is collected or stored.
As a form on a phishing site is submitted, information about the form is
collected and analyzed. Phish Feeder stores information about the form itself
(e.g. action, method) as well as information about each input field on the form








Social Security Number X
Credit Card Number X
Table 3.1: Sensitive Field Classifications
duplicate the original request (see Sections 3.1.2 & 3.1.3 for further details).
Field Classification
In order to produce the most realistic credentials, Phish Feeder’s honeyto-
ken generation algorithm provides multiple different generation strategies. These
generation strategies are applied based on Phish Feeder’s classification of each
field. As the form is submitted, Phish Feeder gathers information about each
field on the form and uses this information to classify specific fields as containing
potentially sensitive information. Honeytoken values are only generated for fields
which contain sensitive information; this reduces the size of the honeytoken set,
and allows Phish Feeder to make more intelligent honeytoken generation deci-
sions. After all sensitive fields have been classified, the appropriate generation
strategies are applied to each field to create the honeytoken values.
Phish Feeder initially considers all input elements of the form and then identi-
fies potentially sensitive fields. Table 3.1 provides a list of the field classifications.
Fields can be classified based on a combination of field type, location within the
form, or the field’s value. Previous work in this area relied on manual user iden-
tification [29] or only considered the password fields [36] of a form. Most of the
field classifications apply to a single field, although some classifications can apply
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to multiple fields within a form (e.g. a credit card number broken up into four
separate fields).
3.1.2 Honeytoken Generation
Phish Feeder uses the information gathered about the form to generate a set
of N honeytokens for the request. Each honeytoken contains a value for every
field on the form. For fields identified as sensitive, a new value based on the
original is generated and used; for all other fields, the original value is used. The
honeytoken generation algorithm used is based on that of BogusBiter [36]; what
follows is an overview of the BogusBiter algorithm, followed by a description of
how the algorithm has been extended for this work.
BogusBiter algorithm
The BogusBiter generation algorithm creates honeytokens for usernames and
passwords; for simplicity, only usernames will be referenced here, as both user-
names and passwords are treated identically by the algorithm. The algorithm
works as follows: first, a character of the username is identified as the replace-
ment character (rc). The replacement character is defined as the first digit in the
username, or the first letter if no digit exists. A position i is randomly chosen be-
tween 1 and N ; this position represents the location of the real username within
the generated set of N usernames. For each position j, the algorithm replaces rc
with a digit (or letter) j − i positions up in the sequence “0123456789” (or the
English alphabet). The sequence is wrapped if necessary (i.e. ’a’ follows ’z’, ’9’
precedes ’0’). Table 3.2 demonstrates the effect of the BogusBiter algorithm on
the username/password pair mcsmith/Fuzzycat15, with N = 4, and i = 3.
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Position Username Password
j = 1 kcsmith Fuzzycat99
j = 2 lcsmith Fuzzycat09
→ i = 3 mcsmith Fuzzycat19
j = 4 ncsmith Fuzzycat29
Table 3.2: BogusBiter Substitution Example #1
Legitimate sites may use the BogusBiter algorithm to detect if invalid creden-
tials were generated by BogusBiter. Due to the linear and deterministic nature
of the algorithm, re-running the algorithm with a size of 2(N − 1) and using
any generated username/password pair as the input will create a new credential
set containing the original (real) username/password pair. Legitimate sites may
provide failed login credentials to this algorithm and search the resultant set for
legitimate username/password pairs. If found, this would suggest — with high
probability — that the failed credentials were generated by BogusBiter.
It is possible that the server-side algorithm may produce collisions when used
on a single field, reporting that credentials were generated by BogusBiter when
they were not. This is especially true when digit-based substitution is used (e.g.
both surfdude1 and surfdude2 may be valid usernames). However, the odds of
correctly generating a valid username and password pair is equivalent to randomly
guessing user passwords [36], so collisions are much less likely when username and
password are considered together.
The BogusBiter generation algorithm works adequately for most usernames
and passwords containing digits, and those conforming to specific patterns (e.g.
a username scheme of [first initial][last name]). However, it does a poor job of
concealing the real credentials when they do not contain digits, and do contain
dictionary words, names, or other patterns. Table 3.3 shows the result of the
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Position Username Password
j = 1 kcsmith Duzzycat
j = 2 lcsmith Euzzycat
→ i = 3 mcsmith Fuzzycat
j = 4 ncsmith Guzzycat
Table 3.3: BogusBiter Substitution Example #2
BogusBiter algorithm on the username/password pair mcsmith/Fuzzycat. In this
example, digit replacement is not used, and the real credential set is much more
recognizable to a human.
Phish Feeder Algorithm
The Phish Feeder algorithm extends the BogusBiter algorithm to provide a
more robust generation process which can adequately handle a wider variety of
inputs. Like the BogusBiter algorithm, Phish Feeder determines one or more
characters in the value to be replaced. This replacement string is chosen from
one of three different replacement strategies based on the field classification. The
replacement strategies are attempted in the following order:
• Digit Replacement: If the value contains one or more digits, the first
group of digits is chosen.
• Word Replacement: If the value contains a dictionary word or popular
name, that word or name is chosen.
• Alpha Replacement: If no digit or word is present, the first letter is
chosen.
The principal new functionality of the generation algorithm is the addition of
word- and name-based replacement. Many usernames and passwords may contain
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dictionary words (or names), but not digits. The BogusBiter algorithm would
change only the first letter of the value, resulting in potentially obvious fake
credentials when compared to the originals. By replacing whole words instead of
single characters, the likelihood of detection is reduced.
Phish Feeder also uses the field’s classification to aid in the generation of
the honeytoken values. For instance, for a field classified as “email”, only the
username (everything left of the ’@’ sign) is considered for replacement; another
example is credit card fields, in which the digits are crafted to pass the credit
card Luhn validity check.
Details on the implementation of the honeytoken generation algorithm can be
found in Section 4.1.3. A user survey was conducted to determine the effectiveness
of the improvements; see Section 5.1 for further information.
3.1.3 Request Duplication
After the necessary information has been collected about the form and the
honeytokens have been generated, N requests are created. Each of these requests
is carefully crafted to be a duplicate of the original, with the exception of the
field values; the request method, origin, referrer, and all other applicable headers
are copied exactly. After the requests are created, they are sent to the server
alongside the original request. The server receives all N +1 requests sequentially.
The position of the real request within the set is randomized to prevent phishers
from distinguishing the original request from the others in a deterministic manner.
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3.2 Honeytoken Repository
The BogusBiter algorithm is partially deterministic and reversible; this strat-
egy allows legitimate servers to create new credential sets using any invalid cre-
dentials as input. If any legitimate credentials are present in the newly generated
set, the invalid credentials were most likely created by BogusBiter. Unfortunately,
this reversibility comes at a price — the algorithm is limited to a deterministic
formula and works well on certain input sets, but quite poorly on others.
The Phish Feeder algorithm opts for more versatile honeytoken generation,
but this comes at the loss of reversibility. Instead, Phish Feeder utilizes a central
repository to store the generated honeytoken values (see Section 4.2). After each
request, the set of generated honeytokens is collected and sent to a central server,
along with the identity of the targeted site, if possible. This repository stores all
of the credentials provided and allows legitimate sites to query it to determine if
invalid credentials were generated by Phish Feeder.
There is a possibility that legitimate sites will be provided with invalid cre-
dentials — due to user error or other innocent means — that are coincidentally
present in the repository. We refer to this as a collision, and we attempt to limit
the effects of collisions by returning detailed responses to lookup queries (see
Section 4.2.2) and associating honeytokens with their intended sites whenever
possible.
3.2.1 Site Identification
Each phishing site deliberately mimics a specific site’s interface and design.
In order to increase the value of the honeytoken repository, honeytokens are
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associated with this mimicked site if at all possible. This allows the repository
lookup service to determine if credentials were intended for a specific legitimate
site, which provides more information to the legitimate sites and reduces the
possibility of a repository collision.
Some previous works use a form of target site identification as part or all of
their phishing site detection mechanisms; current techniques include url analysis,
image recognition, link analysis, and site structure analysis [10] [16]. Phish Feeder
employs a simple but effective heuristic for determining a phishing site’s target.
The domain of each link on the page is gathered and tabulated; the domain with
the highest link count is assumed to be the target site.
3.2.2 Sending Honeytokens
The honeytoken repository acts as a central server for all generated honeyto-
kens. To accomplish this, each Phish Feeder extension sends information about
each set of honeytokens it generates to the repository. For each sensitive field on
the form, Phish Feeder sends the field classification and hashes of all of the gen-
erated values for that field. Phish Feeder also sends the domain of the targeted
site, as determined by the site identification heuristic. The repository stores this
information for use by the lookup service.
3.2.3 Verifying Honeytokens
Target sites can query the repository to identify credentials as Phish Feeder-
generated honeytokens. When a legitimate site receives invalid credentials, it
queries the honeytoken repository lookup service with these values and types.
The repository compares the received credentials to those present in the database
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and returns one or more statuses to the legitimate site, depending on the accuracy
of the match. Further details are discussed in Section 4.2.2.
In this chapter, we have discussed the high-level design of Phish Feeder; the
next chapter expands on some of these ideas and provides a more in-depth dis-




Phish Feeder is implemented as two distinct components: a browser extension
which generates and sends honeytokens, and a server application which stores the
honeytokens and allows querying from legitimate websites. In this chapter, we
discuss the Phish Feeder design and algorithms at a lower level of detail, to
facilitate further understanding and reproducibility.
4.1 Browser Extension
Browser extensions allow developers to add new functionality to popular web
browsers. End-users may add these extensions to their browser in order to change
the way a page is rendered, prevent content from being included, aid web develop-
ment, or a perform any other variety of tasks. Phish Feeder’s browser extension is
responsible for collecting form information, generating honeytokens, and creating
and sending requests.
Phish Feeder is implemented as an extension to the popular Firefox web
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browser. The extension is primarily implemented in just under 2,500 lines of
C++. Although most common Firefox extensions can be written using only a
combination of XUL and JavaScript, we chose C++ as our primary development
language. Using C++ provided access to certain Firefox interfaces which are not
available from JavaScript, and gave us the possibility of linking with additional
third-party libraries if necessary. Additionally, C++ extensions may achieve bet-
ter performance than their JavaScript counterparts [18].
4.1.1 Architecture
While the vast majority of the extension is implemented in C++, other lan-
guages and configuration files are necessary in order to integrate the extension
with Firefox. A Firefox extension uses the XML User Interface Language (XUL)
to define all user interface components; the XUL files can also include JavaScript
to control extension behavior. As Phish Feeder has no user interface or no-
tifications, the XUL file contains only basic JavaScript which loads the C++
component.
In order to interact with the C++ code from JavaScript, an XPCOM interface
was defined. XPCOM (cross-platform component object model) is a framework
for writing cross-platform, cross-language software, similar in nature to the Mi-
crosoft COM. Interfaces are defined using an Interface Description Language, and
can be implemented in JavaScript, Java, Python, or C++ [7]. Phish Feeder de-
fines one simple interface — nsIFeeder — containing two methods: register()
and unregister(). When Firefox is opened, the call to register() loads and
initializes Phish Feeder; on close, the unregister() call performs clean-up oper-




Phish Feeder collects information about each form on a suspected phishing
site as it is submitted; this information is used to classify the form’s inputs. Fields
may be classified by submitted value, type, or type and field position. Each field
receives at most one classification, and the classifications are determined in the
following order:
1. Email: Input’s value matches the pattern of an email address.
2. Credit Card Number: Input’s value is 13 to 16 digits, and passes the
Luhn validity check.
3. Social Security Number: Input’s value is 9 digits, optionally separated
by spaces or dashes into the form (###–##–####).
4. Password: Input’s type is “password”; its value does not match any of the
above criteria.
5. Username: Input’s type is “text”, and it is either one field before or after
a password field; its value does not match any of the above criteria.
6. Other: Input’s type is “text”, contains at least one digit, and does not
meet any other criteria.
Additionally, the Credit Card Number and Social Security Number classifi-
cations may represent multiple fields on a form. The following rules determine if
a group of fields is classified as either of these types.
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1. Credit Card Number: Four consecutive inputs contain four digits each;
the aggregate value passes the Luhn validity check.
2. Social Security Number: Three consecutive inputs contain three, two,
and four digits, respectively.
4.1.3 Honeytoken Generation
Phish Feeder generates a set of values for every classified field. A set of
honeytokens is then created, each of which contains one of the generated values
for each classified field and the original values for all other fields. As the user
submits to a phishing site, a set of requests is generated and sent alongside the
original request. Each of these created requests contains the values from one of
the generated honeytokens.
For each classified field, a set of N values is generated. N is initially set to 9,
although this is configurable. This number was chosen based on previous work,
which found that more than 10 subsequent requests was perceived as a malicious
attack on some legitimate sites.
There are four distinct generation algorithms used to create the honeytoken
values. Each algorithm has criteria which must be satisfied in order for the
algorithm to be used; if the algorithm criteria are not met, the next algorithm
is tried. Table 4.1 shows the algorithm to field correlation. The algorithms are
attempted in the following order: Card Number, Digit, Word, and Character.
This order puts the most successful algorithms — those that have the highest
chance of obfuscating the real credentials — first. What follows is a description
of each algorithm:
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Name Card Number Digit Word Character
Username X X X
Password X X X
Email X X X
Credit Card Number X
Social Security Number X
Other X
Table 4.1: Generation Algorithms Per Field
Card Number:
The Card Number generation algorithm is only used for credit card number
fields. Credit card numbers generally have a issuer-specific prefix of 4-6 digits,
followed by an account number, and the Luhn check digit. The Card Number
generation algorithm generates a random valid credit card number for each field
value. To do this, it keeps the first 6 digits, randomly generates a new account
number, and sets the check digit to 0. The Luhn-algorithmic sum is then calcu-
lated, and the check digit is adjusted as necessary in order make the Luhn sum
evenly divisible by 10; this indicates a syntactically valid credit card number.
This algorithm generates valid credit card numbers only in the sense that they
will pass the Luhn validity check. We are not providing any new or novel infor-
mation to the phishers via this generation strategy, as valid credit card numbers
can be easily generated using this or similar algorithms.
Digit:
The Digit generation algorithm is used for all other fields which contain at
least one digit. The last digit in the first group of digits is chosen as the replace-
ment digit. The replacement digit is then replaced with a different random digit
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N times. Each result is guaranteed distinct with a value of N <= 9; if N is
larger, repetition will occur.
Word:
If no digits are present in the field value, the Word generation algorithm is
tried next. The Word generation algorithm identifies the replacement word as
the largest dictionary word or name present in the field value; if the field value
itself is a word or name, the entire field value is chosen as the replacement word.
Otherwise, substrings of the word are identified and tested for dictionary presence
in descending order of length. For example, for a field value of length M , the
field value is first tested. Then the two substrings of length M − 1, starting at





5 TheDu, heDuk, eDuke
4 TheD, heDu, eDuk, Duke
Table 4.2: Example Word Search for TheDuke
Table 4.2 shows the substrings evaluated for the username TheDuke. In this
example, Duke is chosen as the replacement word. If a dictionary word had been
found before Duke, it would be chosen instead, as longer words are preferred.
Once the replacement word is identified, it is replaced with random words of
the same length N different times to produce the N values for the field. The
replacement words are chosen non-deterministically so as not to reveal any in-
formation about the original value. Currently, the built-in Firefox dictionary is
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used for word lookup and replacement, although Aspell [2] or any other dictionary
library could be used in the future.
Character:
If the criteria for the other generation algorithms are not met, the Character
generation algorithm is used. The first alphabetic character is chosen as the
replacement character, and is replaced with a different random character N times.
Case sensitivity is retained; the replacement character is replaced with a letter
of the same case to preserve capitalization and patterns in the field value.
4.1.4 Site Identification
Phish Feeder uses a link-based site identification heuristic in order to deter-
mine the targeted site for a phishing attack. This information is used later by
the honeytoken repository to reduce the chance of collisions.
Phishing sites are often almost direct copies of legitimate sites; phishers
change the site as little as possible to preserve the image that the site is le-
gitimate. Additionally, rather than host the entire legitimate site, only one or
two pages is copied to reduce overhead. Due to these factors, phishing pages often
contain links back to the original legitimate site. By examining the phishing site
for these links, we may be able to identify the legitimate site.
As the form on the phishing site is submitted, the domain of each link on the
page is observed and counted. As the goal of the heuristic is to determine the
identity of an external site, only absolute links to external domains are tabulated;
relative links, fragments, and JavaScript-based links are not added to the count.







Figure 4.1: Honeytoken Repository Submission Format
site. If no valid external links exist of the page, the site is identified as “unknown”.
4.1.5 Uploading to the Honeytoken Repository
After the legitimate site has been identified and all requests have been sent
to the phishing site, the honeytoken values and identified site domain are sent to
the honeytoken repository. Figure 4.1 shows the request format for submitting
to the repository. For each field, the classification (e.g. username) and a hash
of each generated value are sent. Sending and storing hashed field values allows
for future comparisons without storing the generated values themselves; should
the repository ever become compromised, phishers will not be provided with any
plaintext honeytoken values.
Currently, submissions to the honeytoken repository are sent out unencrypted;
however, we believe it a trivial process to purchase a certificate and perform all
repository requests over secure connections.
34
4.2 Server Web Application
The honeytoken repository serves as a central location for generated honey-
tokens and provides a lookup service for legitimate sites. This service allows
legitimate sites to check invalid credentials against the repository; presence in
the repository indicates the credentials were created by Phish Feeder, and may
be used to identify phishers using stolen credentials. Legitimate sites can use
this information to temporarily block IP addresses or deter the phishers by other
means.
The repository provides two simple services — a submission service which
receives honeytokens from Phish Feeder clients and a lookup service for legitimate
sites to perform credential lookups.
4.2.1 Receiving Honeytokens
As each honeytoken submission is received, it is stored in the repository
database. Each submission is given a unique id and associated with the tar-
get site, if one was provided. Each field classification and hash value are stored
with the submission’s id.
In order to deter malicious clients from spamming the repository, the IP
address of each submission is temporarily stored. The honeytoken repository
limits each IP address to one submission every five minutes.
4.2.2 Honeytoken Lookup Service
The honeytoken repository provides a service which allows legitimate sites to







Figure 4.2: Honeytoken Repository Lookup Request Format
hashes. The lookup request format shown in Figure 4.2 is very similar to the
honeytoken submission format; however, with the lookup request, only one value
per field is included. The fields may be included in the request in any order —
they do not need to be included in the same order as the original submission to
the repository.
When the repository receives the request, it parses the information for each
field and compares the values provided to those in the repository. All matching
field classification and hash value pairs are returned and the strongest match is
reported back to the querying server. The strength of the match is based on
whether or not the target site, field classifications, and field values are matched.
If multiple honeytoken submissions have matching field hash values, the submis-
sion with the higher number of matches is used; if multiple submissions have an
equal number of matching hashes, submissions with matching target sites take
precedence. In case of a tie, the most recent submission is used.
The response from the repository includes an overall confidence in the match,
if the target site matched, and the match results for each of the fields; this report
format presents the querying site with enough information to make an educated








Figure 4.3: Honeytoken Repository Lookup Response Format
Match-Strength:
– MATCH FULL All field information matched;
confirmed Phish Feeder credentials
– MATCH PARTIAL Some field information matched;
possible Phish Feeder credentials
– MATCH NONE No field information matched;
not Phish Feeder credentials
Match-Target-Site:
– TARGET SITE MATCH Target site for data matched request site
– TARGET SITE UNKNOWN Target site for data is unknown
Match-FieldN:
– FIELD MATCH Both classification & hash value matched
– FIELD CLASSIFICATION Only field classification matched
– FIELD VALUE Only field hash value matched
– FIELD NONE No matches for this field
Table 4.3: Repository Lookup Response Values
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Figure 4.3 displays the format for the lookup response, and the possible values
for each of the fields in the response are presented in Table 4.3. The responses for
the Match-Strength and Match-Target-Site fields are independent; both should
be taken into consideration by the legitimate site. If the Match-Strength type
is MATCH NONE, then all field types will be FIELD NONE; likewise, if the Match-
Strength type is MATCH FULL, all field types will be FIELD MATCH. If a query
response includes both MATCH FULL and TARGET SITE MATCH, the querying site
can be fairly certain that the credentials originated from Phish Feeder and take
appropriate action.
It is possible that all of the fields will match (MATCH FULL), but the target
site will not (TARGET SITE UNKNOWN). This indicates that the credentials were
generated for an unidentifiable target site. Phish Feeder only returns results for
credentials with a matching or unknown target site; to prevent unintentional in-
formation leaks, the lookup service will not return matches for a different target
site. Our evaluation in Section 5.2.2 demonstrates that Phish Feeder never iden-
tified a target site incorrectly — the target site was either properly identified or
labeled as “unknown”.
The lookup service is intended for use by legitimate entities only; phishers
with access to the lookup service could systematically query each set of received
credentials to identify those generated by Phish Feeder. To prevent malicious
use, a whitelist of trusted, legitimate IP addresses is maintained and only queries




We evaluated Phish Feeder on three fronts: the effectiveness of the genera-
tion algorithm, the correctness of the extension’s heuristics and behavior, and
the extension’s performance. To test our improvements over previous credential
generation algorithms, we conducted a user survey in which participants were
asked to identify real credentials from a sets generated by either BogusBiter or
Phish Feeder. We ran a variety of experiments to evaluate the correctness of
each of our heuristics and to determine if the real requests within each set were
deterministically identifiable. We also measured the performance overhead of the
extension on both legitimate and phishing sites.
5.1 Generation Algorithm Effectiveness
We claim that the honeytoken generation algorithm used by Phish Feeder is an
improvement over its predecessors, specifically over the BogusBiter substitution
algorithm. The goal of the algorithm is to effectively create fake credentials such
that even a human has a hard time identifying the real credentials within a set.
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(b) Participant Education Levels
Figure 5.1: User Survey Demographics
In order to evaluate this claim, we performed a user survey. Credential sets were
created by running either the Phish Feeder or BogusBiter algorithm on a list of
username/password pairs. Survey participants were presented with one of these
lists and asked to choose the original credentials from each set.
The list of usernames was generated by crawling a popular online news site
and a password list for the “John the Ripper” [3] security tool was obtained.
Usernames and passwords were chosen at random from the two sets to create 25
username/password pairs. Credential Lists B and P were generated by running
the BogusBiter and Phish Feeder generation algorithms, respectively, against the
list of usernames/passwords pairs. Each credential list contained 25 sets of 10
credentials each — the nine generated credentials and the original credentials.
There were 24 total participants in the user study. All participants were mem-
bers of the Computer Science or Computer Engineering departments of California
Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo; the participants included one pro-
fessor and 23 students of varying educational levels. Figures 5.1a and 5.1b provide
histograms of the ages and education levels of the participants, respectively.
Each participant was randomly given either Credential List B or P and was
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Table 5.1: Credential Sets for User Survey Question #7
asked to identify the original credentials from the sets. For convenience, we will
refer to those presented with Credential Lists B and P as Group B and Group P,
respectively. Table 5.1 displays an example credential set for each algorithm.
We evaluated the survey responses based on the number of incorrectly chosen
credentials; a survey participant choosing the incorrect credentials corresponds
phishers using generated credentials instead of the originals. The results from the
two groups were compared to discover which algorithm worked the best overall
and which worked better in specific cases. Figure 5.2 shows the percent of incor-
rect responses for each generation algorithm. Overall, the Phish Feeder algorithm
was more successful at hiding the real credentials; members of Group P chose the
correct credentials from the set only 59.7% of the time, compared to 88.3% of the
time for Group B.
The results show that the BogusBiter proved completely ineffective for 17
of the 25 credential sets; for these sets, members of Group B always correctly
chose the real credentials. In contrast, the same was only true for 2 of the
25 credential sets created by the Phish Feeder algorithm. The real credentials
from sets 8 and 9 — Texasbig/firebird and Purple patriot/europe — were always
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Figure 5.2: User Survey Results — Percent Fake Credentials Chosen
By Algorithm
identified correctly in both credential lists. These credentials contained multiple
related words and compound words, both suboptimal choices for single character
or word replacement.
The BogusBiter algorithm out-performed the Phish Feeder algorithm in only
two cases, credential sets 6 and 14. In the case of credential set 6 — Nug Mas-
ter/Tanker — Phish Feeder replaced Master and Tanker with less-common En-
glish words, while BogusBiter’s character replacement performed well and actu-
ally created other common words (Tug, Rug, Banker). With credential set 14 —
blh1616/gilles — both the Phish Feeder and BogusBiter algorithms performed
digit substitution on the username; however Phish Feeder used word substitu-
tion on the password (choosing gill as the replacement text), while BogusBiter
performed character substitution. Both algorithms preformed well, but the Bo-
gusBiter credential set received two more correct responses.
The Phish Feeder algorithm outperformed the BogusBiter algorithm in 23
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out of 25 cases, and survey participants chose fake credentials almost four times
as frequently when presented with the Phish Feeder credential list. The Phish
Feeder algorithm significantly improves the chance that a phisher will attempt
to use fake credentials before the real ones. As discussed in Section 3.2, this may
allow legitimate sites to identify phishers before they have an opportunity to use
the real credentials.
5.2 Extension Evaluation
We performed a variety of experiments to evaluate both the correctness and
performance of the Firefox extension. The correctness tests focus on demonstrat-
ing that the user’s experience is not hampered, that the various identification
techniques are adequate, and that the generated requests are indistinguishable
from the real user request. The performance tests seek to demonstrate the over-
head imposed by the Phish Feeder extension is reasonable for the end-user. All
tests were run on an Intel i7 2.66GHz machine with 6GB of RAM and a 500GB
HDD.
In several experiments, we refer to our Pond — a set of locally hosted phishing
sites. We gathered 20 different phishing sites from the Phishtank Phish Archive
[27]. The top 20 most recently reported sites were examined and downloaded
locally. Phishers often operate several identical sites hosted at different locations.
In order to evaluate our various heuristics against a broader input set, we avoided
downloading and including multiple sites with the exact same layout and features.
These sites were stored and hosted locally, as the lifetime of the average phishing
site is too short to allow for repeatable testing. A report by the APWG claims
that the average uptime of a phishing site is only 3 days [19].
43
google.com yahoo.com youtube.com facebook.com live.com
msn.com wikipedia.org blogger.com myspace.com wordpress.com
ebay.com craigslist.com flickr.com amazon.com aol.com
twitter.com hi5.com photobucket.com imdb.com skyrock.com
Table 5.2: Top 20 English-Speaking Sites
5.2.1 Correctness: False Positives
Phish Feeder does not intercept form submissions or generate honeytokens
until the user navigates to a suspected phishing site. Infrequently, the user may
navigate to a legitimate website which is incorrectly labeled as a phishing site.
In this situation, the behavior of the Phish Feeder tool should not prohibit users
from successfully navigating the site and should not appear to the server as a
malicious attack. To test this, we compiled a list of the top 20 English-speaking
sites from the Alexa Top 500 [5], as of June 2009. The list of sites accessed and
tested with is shown in Table 5.2.
An account was created at each of the test sites. The Phish Feeder extension
was configured to treat every page as a potential phishing site to emulate false
positives from the Firefox phishing filter. We attempted to login to each of the
test sites and recorded the observed behavior; at each of the 20 sites, we were able
to successfully login without any adverse effects. This suggests that occasional
phishing filter false positives will not cause Phish Feeder to adversely affect the
user experience.
5.2.2 Correctness: Site Identification
Phish Feeder uses a basic site identification heuristic based on links to external
domains to determine which legitimate site a phishing site is targeting. The target
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site is determined to be the most frequently-linked domain on the page. To test
this, we ran the site identification heuristic against the 20 sites in the Pond and
manually verified the results.
Of the 20 phishing sites, the Phish Feeder heuristic was able to correctly
determine the targeted site 40% (8) of the time. The rest of the target sites were
unidentifiable either because the site contained no links (20%) or only relative
links (40%). As discussed in Section 4.1.4, only absolute links are considered for
the site identification heuristic. The heuristic obtained a 40% true positive rate
and a 0% false positive rate — the heuristic never incorrectly identified the target
site.
Associating generated credentials with their target sites increases the value
of the honeytoken repository and reduces lookup collisions. However, legitimate
sites using the lookup service may still receive results for credentials which have
no associated target site. Site identification — while beneficial — is not crucial to
the success of the system. For this reason, a 40% identification rate is currently
acceptable, although future work may be done to improve this percentage through
addition of new or existing heuristics.
5.2.3 Correctness: Field Identification
Phish Feeder uses its field identification and classification heuristics to perform
intelligent credential generation. We populated form data on each site in the
Pond, submitted the form, and recorded the classification for each field. Most of
the forms contained a simple username or email and password prompt, with a
few exceptions. Figure 5.3 shows the breakdown of form inputs for the test sites.





user+pass email+pass account+pass other
Figure 5.3: Form Input Categorization for Pond Test Sites
correctly identified the 76 total input fields on the 20 different forms, with zero
false positives. A field identification was deemed correct if the field contained
a type of sensitive data handled by Phish Feeder, and the algorithm correctly
identified the field type. There were additional types of sensitive data contained
within these forms which are not specifically addressed by Phish Feeder (e.g. date
of birth or credit card expiration date); this may also serve as a point for future
work.
5.2.4 Correctness: Position and Timing Tests
The success of Phish Feeder depends on its ability to properly hide the real
request amongst the generated ones; if the phisher is able to automatically deter-
mine the real request from a set, the system will fail. We preformed two separate
tests to demonstrate that the real request is adequately hidden — a test which
inspected the position of the real request within the set and a timing test which
examined patterns of the time intervals between each request in the set.
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Figure 5.4: Frequency of Real Request Position Within Request Set
We chose one phishing page from the Pond which contained a simple user-
name/password form, and submitted the form 150 times; each form submission
triggered Phish Feeder’s credential generation algorithm, which resulted in a to-
tal of 1500 requests to our server. We examined each set of 10 requests and
determined the position of the real request within the set. Figure 5.4 displays
the frequency of real request positions within their respective sets. While not
perfectly uniform at this sample size, the graph shows that the real request po-
sition occurs with an even enough distribution that no request can be assumed
fake based on its position within the set.
To validate that the request creation did not introduce any timing oddities,
we recorded the time each request resulting from the last 50 form submissions
was received. The time intervals between each request within a set were analyzed
and compared to the intervals for the requests directly before and after the real
request. The results of this comparison are available in Table 5.3. The real




Average 7.85 ms 7.77 ms
Median 8 ms 8 ms
Std. Dev. 0.73 ms 0.70 ms
Table 5.3: Time Intervals Between Requests – All vs. Real Requests
We have demonstrated that the real request can not be distinguished by
either its position within the request set or the time delay between requests. As
all properties of the request itself are duplicated between the requests — with the
exception of the generated credentials replacing the originals — we observe that
the only way for a phisher to distinguish the real request is to manually identify
which credentials are real and which are fake.
5.2.5 Performance Testing
In the preceding evaluations, we have shown that the Phish Feeder exten-
sion functions as intended; however, if the extension disrupts the user experience
through sluggish performance, its usefulness becomes quite limited. What fol-
lows are a series of experiments to measure the overhead incurred by installing
and using the Phish Feeder extension. We observed the overhead in generating
honeytokens and the overall delay in form submissions.
We logged the time necessary to gather form information and generate hon-
eytokens from two of the sites from the Pond. The first site contained a basic
username/password login form; the second contained fifteen fields of different clas-
sifications. We found gathering form information and generating honeytokens to
take between 1–5 milliseconds, depending on the site structure and complexity.
























Figure 5.5: Average Request Times to Test Sites With And Without
Extension Enabled
— one phishing and one legitimate — both with and without the Phish Feeder
extension enabled. For the legitimate site, this measures the overhead incurred
from Phish Feeder’s “quiet state”, in which it is monitoring requests and waiting
for the user to navigate to a suspected phishing site. For the phishing site, this
measures the overhead of generating honeytokens and creating requests. We
chose a PayPal site from the Pond as our sample phishing site, and a local copy
of the actual PayPal login page as our legitimate site. Each site’s login form was
submitted 5 times and the average request time was recorded. The Extended
Statusbar Firefox extension was used to record request times [23].
Figure 5.5 displays the results from the performance tests. On the phishing
site, as requests are being created and sent, Phish Feeder introduced marginal
overhead. In the more common case of browsing legitimate sites, the observed
overhead is negligible. We feel comfortable that for the large majority of users’
web browsing, the overhead will be unnoticeable; in the less common case of sub-




Phishing continues to prove successful for the phishers; hundreds of new phish-
ing sites are launched daily in an attempt to gather large sets of user credentials.
Anti-phishing groups, corporations, and researchers continue to develop anti-
phishing technologies to detect phishing sites and emails, alert users of phishing
attacks, and to generally reduce the effectiveness of phishers. This collection of
anti-phishing tools and technologies continues to increase in size and complexity
as phishing sites become increasingly realistic and convincing.
In this paper, we have presented Phish Feeder, an anti-phishing tool which
uses carefully-crafted fake credentials to clutter phishers’ databases, hide real
users’ credentials, and serve as a potential phisher identification tool. Once the
user submits a form on a suspected phishing site, the credential generation algo-
rithm creates a set of fake credentials based on the user’s real credentials, then
submits the entire credential set to the phishing site. The generated creden-
tials are then sent to a honeytoken repository to facilitate future querying from
legitimate sites.
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Users who install the Phish Feeder extension are protected on any suspected
phishing site and their user experience remains unaffected on all other sites.
Our performance testing showed that the monitoring Phish Feeder performs on
legitimate sites introduces a negligible overhead. Our testing also indicates that
Phish Feeder will not adversely effect the user experience when phishing detection
encounters a false positive.
Our credential generation algorithm intelligently generates credentials based
on users’ real credentials. We conducted a survey in which users were presented
with sets of credentials and asked to identify the real credentials within each
set; users were able to chose the real credentials less than 60% of the time, a
significant improvement over previous credential generation algorithms.
The generated credentials are sent to the phishing site alongside the real
request. Our testing shows no identifiable heuristic for determining the real
request from the set based on position or timing.
We suggest a central honeytoken repository to store the generated credentials
and provide a lookup service for legitimate sites. This service allows legitimate
sites to determine if invalid credentials were generated by Phish Feeder. This
information can potentially be used to identify phishers and protect end-users.
Our evaluation confirms that Phish Feeder represents an improvement over




Phish Feeder represents a step forward in the area of fake-credential-based
anti-phishing tools. While it has met its goals, there is room for improvements
and additions to the various heuristics present in the tool.
Phish Feeder identifies target sites based on a simple link-based heuristic.
In our evaluation, this heuristic was able to identify 40% of the target sites.
Target site identification allows the credentials to be associated with the correct
site in the repository, which can increase lookup response confidence and reduce
collisions. Various additions may be made to this heuristic to increase the success
rate, including image and site layout recognition [10] [16].
Phish Feeder currently identifies and handles usernames, passwords, social
security numbers, credit card numbers, and email addresses. Phish Feeder also
generates honeytoken values for any field containing digits. Future work could
improve heuristics for identifying existing field classifications, or add new classi-
fications to represent sensitive information not included in the above list.
While Phish Feeder’s credential generation algorithm represented a signifi-
cant improvement over the previous work, more than half the credentials were
still properly identified by users. Phish Feeder’s word-based generation algo-
rithm performed inadequately when the credentials contained multiple correlated
words. This may be improved by updating the generation algorithm to choose
words related to the chosen replacement word, or to give higher preference to
more-frequently used English words. Expanding the algorithm to work in lan-
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